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INTRODUCTION
Let me start with two items of received wisdom: 1) Copyright is
territorially-based;' 2) Cyberspace is not. But copyrighted works
circulate in cyberspace. What does that mean for their protection? I
have not labeled this essay "The Cyberian Captivity of Copyright,"
just because the title is alliterative and fittingly portentious for an
Essay adapted from The First Annual Santa Clara University School of Law School
Distinguished Lecture in High Technology Law, November 18, 1998. Copyright © 1999 Jane
C. Ginsburg.
t Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law. Thanks to Prof. Graeme Dinwoodie, Prof. Henry Monaghan, Prof.
Leo Raskind, Prof. Robert Bone, and to Andrew Thompson, Columbia Law School, Class of
1999.
1. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT §§ 16.0-16.2 (2d ed. & Supp. 1998).
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inaugural lecture. Rather, like the "Babylonian Captivity" of the
papacy in Avignon that the title recalls, it suggests a displacement of
an international institution. This need not mean, however, that the
displacement is a Bad Thing - after all, the French probably have a
more favorable view of the Avignon sojourn than might others.
(Similarly, as a Danish law professor testily informed me, the events
provoking the fifth-century collapse of the Western Roman Empire
that we in the U.S. learned to call the "Barbarian Invasions," Northern
Europeans name the "Great Migrations.") It generally depends on
whether one analyzes the issue from the point of view of the displacer
or the displacee.
In this essay, the point of view I wish to take is that of authors
who create or disseminate works over digital networks. I believe that
their situation reflects both perspectives. Like the Avignon popes and
the fifth century Roman emperors, authors might be considered
displaced persons, because others might cast their works into the
digital Empyrean, disconnected from physical points of attachment to
any particular jurisdiction. But, like the Germanic tribes that crossed
the Rhine River late in December 406, at least some authors might
also be considered the displacers, because they choose to exploit the
newly-found technological irrelevance of national borders. For
example, in the analog world, selecting the country of first publication
was a momentous choice, because it grounded the work in that
country's legal system.2 By contrast, however, today's authors can
disseminate works through websites, or mount their own websites on
servers whose nationality they may neither know nor care about.
Today's authors may choose to use the Net to publish their works
instantaneously in every country where users have Internet access.
The central issue is this: For authors, what are the consequences
of this displacement of copyright exploitation from a legal regime
rooted in a territorially bounded analog world, towards a reality
situated in a ubiquitous digital world? Can one still identify a work's
nationality, and does that matter? What about copyright ownership?
Infringement? To a greater or lesser extent, every one of these
concepts has been grounded on principles of territoriality. But if
authors and their works are no longer territorially tethered, can
changes in the fundamental legal conceptions of existing regimes for
2. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg & Pierre Sirinelli, Authors and Exploitations in
International Private Law: The French Supreme Court and the Huston Film Colorization
Controversy, 15 COLum.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 135 (1991) (discussing differing treatment of
authors of motion pictures under French and U.S. law).
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the protection of authors be far behind? On the other hand, since
cyberspace is not yet its own jurisdiction, future regimes must still
derive their authority from territorial sovereigns. How then, does one
project onto supra-national exploitations national substantive norms?
Consider the following hypothetical, inspired by a real
controversy. 3  Fred, a publisher from a country we shall call
Freedonia (with due credit to the Marx Brothers), produces a
webpage, emanating from a server in that country. The webpage
features photographs taken by American and foreign authors. In
some cases, the images on the Freedonian site come from analog-
published magazine photographs that the Freedonian entrepreneur has
scanned and uploaded, without the authors' permission. In other
cases, the Freedonian entrepreneur has, once again without authorial
permission, downloaded the images from other websites The
photographers now claim that the Freedonian publisher has violated
U.S. copyright law by making copies of the photos available to U.S.
users via the website.
This scenario raises many problems. This essay will consider
four of them. First, with respect to those photographs first disclosed
on websites, where are they "published"? What is (or are) their
"country (or countries) of origin"? Fixing the country of origin is
relevant to determining whether the works are protectable under U.S.
copyright law.
Second, identifying the work's country of origin also is relevant
to the question of copyright ownership. For example, the copyright
law of the country of origin might tell us whether the copyright
owners of the photographs are the photographers, or if the copyright
owner is instead the magazine or website publisher. Thus, even if the
works were protected in the U.S., the question still remains whether
the photographers have any rights to assert.
Third, with respect to the issue of infringement, what country's
copyright law applies? Is the response, the. law of each country in
which the public can receive the website? This approach, while it
3. The events inspiring the hypothetical concern the unauthorized scanning and
uploading to a cybercafe's website of Le Grand Secret, a banned biography of the late French
President Mittdrand. The events were reported at the time by the French press. See Michel
Alberganti & Herv6 Morin, Internet Contourne la Censure du Livre du Docteur Gubler, LE
MONDE, Jan. 25, 1996, at 1; Paul-Andr6 Tavoillot, Le Droit de l'Internet Existe Personne ne Pa
Rencontri, LA TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1996, at 6; David Dufresne, Besanfon, Site Sismique, LE
CAHIER MULTIEDIA DE LimtRATION, Jan. 26, 1996, at I-Il. See also Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1034-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (concerning an Italian
website that made "Playmen" magazine available for worldwide downloading).
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respects conventional notions of territoriality, also carries
cumbersome consequences: it might mean that a court must apply the
laws of every country in the world from which Internet access may be
had. We will therefore inquire into alternative principles to designate
legislative competence over infringements.4
Fourth, and finally, let us shift focus from infringement to
licensing. Principles of territoriality would again suggest that a
copyright exploiter who seeks to clear rights for use on the Internet
must obtain rights for each potential country of receipt. But here
again, the implementation of that principle seems excessively
unwieldy. We will therefore explore the alternative of confining
legislative competence to the country from which the work is made
available.5
ARE FOREIGN AUTHORS PROTECTED IN THE U.S.?
Recall that Fred the Freedonian collected the photographs from
two kinds of sources, print magazines, and the Internet. We shall
assume that the photographs that Fred downloaded were first
disclosed over the Internet. Whether the print and digital media
photographs are protected in the U.S. is easier to answer than who is
the proper copyright claimant. Works by non-U.S. authors that are
first published outside the U.S. will be protected, and treated as if
they were U.S. works, if any of the following three criteria apply:
1) the country of first publication is a member of a multilateral treaty
of which the U.S. is a member; 2) that country otherwise enjoys
copyright relations with the U.S.; or, 3) the author is a national or
domiciliary of such a country.6 Assuming that the photographers are
nationals or domiciliaries of one of the 131 countries that are party to
4. A significant additional issue concerns the question of whether the U.S., or any other
national forum, would have jurisdiction to hear the full geographical scope of copyright
infringement claims against a foreign defendant, such as our Freedonian, who has made a work
available in every country of the world, but who neither resides in, nor has made the work
available from the forum, for example by sending it to a webpage hosted by a U.S. server. For
present purposes, I will confine the inquiry to downloads received (or receivable) in the U.S.
For a more extensive analysis of this question, see, for example, Jane Ginsburg & Myriam
Gauthier, The Celestial Jukebox and Earthbound Courts: Judicial Competence in the European
Union and the United States over Copyright Infringements in Cyberspace, in 173 REVUE
INTERNATIoNALE Du DRorr D'AUTEuR 61 (1997).
5. Inquiry into the liability of the service providers that host or provide access to Fred's
webpage is beyond the scope of this Essay. For analysis of the liability of online service
providers under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, and its implications for foreign authors
and website operators, see Jane C. Ginsburg, News from the U.S., Part I, in 179 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AuTEUR 143 (1999).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1994).
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the Berne Convention,7 the photos will be protected, regardless of
their place of first publication. 8 Moreover, when a work is published
via the Internet, one might conclude that the work is simultaneously
"first" published in every country in the world, including in the U.S.
In that case, the work would be considered a U.S. work, and its
protection under U.S. law would be assured - or assured to the
extent that U.S. law applies, and can offer meaningful protection.
Even if, however, U.S. law applies to determine that the foreign-
originated photographs benefit from the protection of the U.S.
copyright laws, we still need to determine whether the photographers
themselves are the proper claimants. And in order to make that
determination, we need to identify the law that is competent to govern
initial copyright ownership. The Second Circuit, in the first federal
appellate decision to squarely confront the question of what law
applies to determine copyright ownership, held that U.S. courts
should consult the law of the country having the most significant
relationship to the creation and publication of the foreign work. 9
Applying this rule, if the photographers are copyright owners under
the law of that country, then their copyright ownership in the U.S.
should be recognized as well.
Traditionally, the country with the most significant relationship
to the work would be the country of first publication.10 With respect
to the magazines, that country should be easy to ascertain. But, with
respect to the Internet sources, identifying the country of first
publication is not so simple a matter. For example, "publication"
traditionally meant distribution of copies to the public.11
Accordingly, when a work is first disclosed over the Internet, should
one therefore look to the country where the public first received
copies? Such a place might be difficult to establish. Moreover, that
7. See Contracting Parties of Treaties Administered by WIPO: Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (visited March 15, 1999)
<http://www.wipo.orglenglratific/e-berne.htm> for a list of current signatories to the Berne
Convention.
8. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 3.1(a),
June 4, 1986, Hein's No. KAV 2245, Temp. State Dep't No. 99-27, at 40.
9. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir.
1998) (looking to the law of the country with the most significant relationship to the work to
determine initial copyright ownership; in that case, that country was the country of the work's
first publication).
10. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5.4 (stating country of first publication is
deemed "country of origin").
11. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of publication); Berne Convention, supra
note 8, at art. 3.3 (definition of "published works").
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location may well be arbitrary, since the country of first receipt could
depend, for example, on nothing more than the recipients' relative
modem speeds. Perhaps, then, one should look to the country or
countries from which the authors uploaded the work to their websites.
This approach too, however, might be completely arbitrary, because
one may upload a work from anywhere, including a country one is
just passing through. The work therefore may have no meaningful
connection to the country of upload.
What then of the country or countries in which are localized the
websites and servers from which the photographs first became
available to the public? This could be a relevant criterion, if the
uploading author selected the website or server because of qualities
relevant to its geographical location. In such a case, the author would
have chosen to associate the work with a particular jurisdiction. If,
however, as may often be the case, the author is unaware of or
indifferent to the territory in which the server is located, the place of
the server will have no particular significance for the work. This may
often be the case when the author posts the work to her own webpage.
In that case, the country with the most significant relationship to the
work may be the country of the author's residence. By contrast,
however, when the author posts to a third-party webpage, the third
party may assume a role analogous to that of a traditional publisher.
If so, the country in which the webpage is localized might be
considered the country of the photograph's origin. That country
might be the country where the server is located, but instead it might
also be the country of the residence or principal place of business of
the webpage operator.
Let us focus on a concrete example, by returning to Fred the
Freedonian, and his website. Suppose that the photographs featured
on Fred's site include images by the renowned French photojournalist
Henriette Bresson-Cartier. Suppose further that she is employed by
an Internet photo magazine called Magma, whose principal place of
business is located in a country we shall call Pontevedro, with due
acknowledgment to Franz Lehar's The Merry Widow. Magma's
website, however, is not located on a Pontevedran server. Rather,
because of the superior capacity U.S. online service providers offer,
the Magma webpage resides on the server of the (fictional) U.S.
service provider, Pangaea. Under these circumstances, which is the
country with the most significant relationship to Bresson-Cartier's
photos? The answer matters, because that country's law will
determine who is the copyright owner. Under U.S. law's "works
made for hire" doctrine, the copyright in works created by employees
COPYRIGHTAND TERRITORIALITY
belongs automatically to the employer. 12 Consequently, if U.S. law
applied, Magma would be the copyright owner; Bresson-Cartier
would have no standing to sue Fred the Freedonian. French law, by
contrast, does not attribute copyright ownership to the employer. The
publisher of a "collective work," such as a magazine, owns the
copyright in the collective work, but not in the separate contributions;
although the contributors are not permitted to exploit their
contributions in a way that competes with the exploitation of the
works as a whole. 13 If French law applied, therefore, either or both
Magma and Bresson-Cartier might be proper plaintiffs, depending on
whether Fred the Freedonian's copying was limited to single images,
or captured some of the collective aspects of Magma's magazine.
Under Pontevedran law, we will postulate that authors retain full
copyright ownership of their works regardless of their employment
status, and that there is no special provision for collective works.
That would mean that only Bresson-Cartier would have a claim
against Fred.
Based on the principles outlined earlier, I believe the country
with the most significant relationship to the work is Pontevedro, home
to Bresson-Cartier's employer-publisher. Admittedly, the U.S. has a
link to the work, since Bresson-Cartier's publisher deliberately
selected a U.S.-based server because of its superior technical capacity.
Nonetheless, the more significant relationship would seem to be the
one between the work's creator and the party who commissions and
arranges for the disclosure of the work, in this case, Magma. To draw
on an analog world analogy, the location of the printing plant is not
usually taken into consideration in identifying either the place of a
work's "publication" or the country with the most significant
relationship to the work. Hence, an American "coffee table" book
may well be printed in Italy, where the quality and cost of color
printing may compete favorably against the services of U.S. printers,
but the book itself does not assume an Italian nationality as a result.
The balance of significant contacts might be different were Bresson-
Cartier a freelance photographer who had no particular relationship
with the website publisher. In that case, the law of the author's
residence might better apply.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (definition of work made for hire); id. at § 201(a).
13. CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L.-113-5 (Fr.), translated in
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1991-1995); Paris Ct. App., Decision
of April 18, 1991, in 153 REvuE INTERNATIONALE DU DROrT D'AuTEUR 166 (1992).
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WHAT LAW APPLIES?
If Pontevedran law applies to determine copyright ownership and
standing to sue, then Henriette Bresson-Cartier may initiate an
infringement action in the U.S. Fred the Freedonian would be subject
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts because copies of Bresson-
Cartier's works are accessible in the U.S. via Fred's website.14 What
national law will apply to the copyright infringement claim? At first
blush, one might conclude that U.S. law applies, because the court's
jurisdiction turns on copies that can be received in the U.S.
Assuming, however, that the court also had jurisdiction over Fred
regarding infringement claims concerning copies received outside the
U.S., what law would apply to those claims? Logically, the law of
each jurisdiction in which the photographs can be downloaded would
apply. But, this result, albeit consistent with the principle of
territoriality, produces such a plethora of laws, that one might fear
dismissal of the foreign-law claims - and maybe even the U.S. law
claim - on grounds of forum non conveniens, especially if the
plaintiff and defendant are non-U.S. parties. (A few years ago, a
majority of a Ninth Circuit panel resorted to this kind of litigation
insularity in Creative Technologies v. Aztech Systems.15) It might be
simpler if only the law of the country from which the infringement
originated applied. But what if it turns out that Freedonia is to
copyright law what the Cayman Islands are to tax law? We do not
want to formulate a choice of law rule that will encourage Internet
entrepreneurs to migrate to "copyright havens." 16
As a variation on this theme, we might presume that the law of
the point of departure applied, but allow the plaintiff to invoke the
laws of the places of receipt, in the event that the former turned out to
be a copyright haven.17 Where the defendant's law offers a sufficient
level of protection, the copyright owner may prefer to invoke that
law, both because it makes the court's task simpler (particularly if the
forum is also defendant's), and also because, in some cases, that law
14. With respect to the standing of other photographers whose works Fred the Freedonian
has posted to its website, it would be necessary to identify the countries whose law will
determine copyright ownership.
15. Creative Techs., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995)
(dismissing forforum non conveniens because both plaintiff and defendant were Singaporean).
16. See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive concerning cable and
satellite transmissions, Explanatory Memorandum, COM (91)276 final at 4.
17. Cf. Andreas Reindl, Choosing Law in Cyberspace: Copyright Conflicts on Global
Networks, 19 MicH. J. INT'L. L. 799 (1998) (proposing alternatives to the law of the point of
departure).
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may in fact be more protective than the law of some of the countries
of receipt. This last feature makes this proposal attractive to
copyright plaintiffs. However, is it fair to copyright defendants? One
might argue that defendants have, in effect, already engaged in
applicable-law-shopping, by locating their residences or business
operations in a particular country. If a defendant wished to be subject
to a weaker law, it could have moved to that country. So it cannot be
unfair to subject a defendant to the worldwide application of a law
that was of its own choosing. 18
On the other hand, this approach abandons the basic premise of
territoriality that underlies international copyright law.19 It disregards
the interest that individual sovereign nations may have in seeing that
their laws apply to infringements that can be localized on their
territories. Effective enforcement of the author's rights presumes that
the author enjoys those rights in each territory for which enforcement
is sought, but authors may enjoy more rights in some territories than
in others.
The territoriality objection also renders problematic another
alternative choice of law rule, one that would look to the law of the
country with the most significant relationship to the work.20 If we are
only dealing with Henriette Bresson-Cartier's claim in her freelance
photographs, this approach would have the considerable practical
appeal of simplifying the action, so that only the law, in this case, of
the author's residence applies. On the other hand, if there are many
plaintiff authors (or publishers), this approach will not simplify
matters. Moreover, even limiting the claim to Henriette's, this
approach does effectively allow French copyright law to rule the
world - a result to be applauded, or deplored, depending on whether
or not one is a Francophile. More seriously, because this approach
turns the law of the author's or publisher's residence into the law that
determines defendant's liability for the entire world, it may promote a
different kind of migration - of authors, and particularly publishers,
to the most copyright-protective jurisdictions. Just as courts will be
reluctant to apply a law that offers inadequate protection, so some
courts, particularly in the U.S., will hesitate to apply a law that does
18. A possible unintended consequence of this argument is to hasten flight to copyright
havens.
19. See Berne Convention, supra note 8, at art. 5.2.
20. A special commission of the French Conseil d'Etat has recently advanced this
proposal. See FRANCE, CONSEIL D'ETAT, INTERNET ET LES RtlSEAuX NumfIvQuES 150-52
(1998).
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not recognize exceptions to copyright along the lines of our "fair use"
doctrine.21
If defendant's law is too lax, and plaintiff's law too unforgiving,
perhaps we need to reconsider resort to the laws of the countries of
receipt. One way to alleviate the complexity of distributive
application of the laws of the countries of receipt of infringing
communications might be. to presume that the laws of all these
countries have assimilated the minimum standards of protection
commanded by the Berne Convention and TRIPs accord, 22 and leave
proof to the contrary to the defendant. 23  In effect, the forum
(assuming it is a Beme or WTO country) would apply its own
copyright law to adjudicate the infringement claim, on the theory that
its domestic law implements the substantive provisions of these
treaties. Through its adoption of the treaties, the forum's law thus
becomes a kind of supranational copyright law,24 subject to
demonstration that in particular countries the standard is less (or
more) protective. In order to avoid divergences among jurisdictions,
the forum might also interpret its own law in light of other national
courts' interpretations of their substantive obligations under the Berne
Convention.25 In either event, the court would then apply the national
law(s) at issue to determine whether an infringement occurred in that
particular territory, and if so, what should be the remedy. 26 Applying
21. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (open-ended criteria) with CODE DE LA PROPRIETE
INTELLECruELLE, art. L.-122-5 (Fr.), translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD (Supp. 1991-1995) (closed list of exceptions to protection).
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instrument - Results
of the Uruguay Round, vol. 321, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
23. Cf Pearce v. Ove Arup Partnership Ltd. [1997] L.R. 293 (Ch.) (presuming similarity
of Dutch copyright law with English copyright law); RICHARD FENTIMAN, FOREIGN LAW:
PLEADING AND PROOF 147-53 (1998) (discussing English courts' presumption that the content
of foreign law is the same as that of English law).
24. This approach has attracted both adherents and detractors among U.S. judges
confronting similar problems of a multiplicity of applicable laws in the context of mass tort
litigation. Compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 708-13
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding it not necessary to apply presumption regarding the content of foreign
law since the court instead determined that the states whose laws were at issue would apply a
"national consensus" law to the mass tort claim at issue), with In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,
51 F.3d 1293, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding district court exceeded discretion in proposing to
apply an amalgamated common law standard to determine negligence in a 50-state class action
suit).
25. Cf. Air France v. Sacks, 470 U.S. 392, 399-400 (1985) (interpreting Warsaw
Convention in light of, inter alia, French court's interpretations).
26. See, e.g., Louknitsky v. Louknitsky, 266 P.2d 910, 911 (Cal. App. 1954); Leary v.
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this approach to Henriette's claim against Fred, if Henriette sues in
the U.S., the court should apply U.S. law to determine worldwide
infringement, subject to a showing by Fred that in some jurisdictions,
no violation would be held to occur.
FROM INFRINGEMENT TO LICENsING
The analysis so far suggests that, far from being held captive in a
lawless Cyberia, international copyright in the digital age will remain
territorially grounded, although that grounding will be alleviated by
some supranational norms that transcend national boundaries. But so
far we have considered the problems of Fred, the Freedonian website
operator, and Henriette Bresson-Cartier, the photographer, only from
the point of view of copyright infringement. Let us suppose instead
that Fred seeks a license from Henriette so that he may post her
photographs with authorization. Let us also suppose that Henriette no
longer owns worldwide rights to all of her photographs. For more
recent works, we will assume that Magma has acquired a world-wide
exclusive Internet distribution license, and is not inclined to
sublicense Fred. So Fred turns to Henriette's older works. We will
suppose that, back in the analog days, Henriette engaged in territorial
licensing, granting North American publication rights to one
publisher, European rights to another, and so on across the continents.
From whom must Fred obtain Internet rights to the photographs?
A first question is whether Henriette's contracts with print
publishers would be interpreted to extend to new modes of
exploitation, such as digital media. The answer will turn on the
domestic law that governs the contract, as well as the precision (or
lack of it) of the contract's terms. In some jurisdictions, the copyright
law prohibits grants of rights in modes of exploitation unknown at the
time of contracting; 27 in others, these grants are permitted, so long as
the contract explicitly covers them;28 in still others, courts confronted
with grants that are ambiguous as to their scope interpret the contracts
Gledhill, 84 A.2d 725, 728-29 (N.J. 1951). But cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 819-23 (1985) (declining to apply Kansas law when Kansas had little connection to either
the plaintiffs or the suit's subject matter); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 740-
44 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying multistate class action because the district court failed
adequately to analyze possible variations in state law).
27. See, e.g., German Copyright Act of September 9, 1965 [Urheberrechtsgesetz]
(published in Bundesgesetzblatt, I, p. 1273, No. 51, of September 16, 1965), translated in 1
COPYRIGHT 251 (1965), art. 31(4).
28. See, e.g., CODE DE LA PROPRIETE INTELLECTUELLE, art. L.-131-6 (Fr.), translated in
COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREA=TS OF THE WORLD (Supp. 1991-1995).
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by applying a presumption that, depending on the jurisdiction, places
the burden either on the grantor to withhold rights,29 or on the grantee
specifically to obtain them. 30 Fred may end up negotiating with
Henriette for some territories, and with her grantee publishers for
others.
Does Fred have to obtain rights from all holders of territorial
rights in Henriette's photographs if he wishes to make the
photographs available over the Internet? Arguably, it might be
sufficient to clear rights in the country from which a digital
dissemination emanates. The cumbersomeness of an obligation to
obtain rights for all countries in which the dissemination can be
received spurred adoption of a simplified rule in the European Union
regarding satellite transmissions. 31 Since many countries may come
within the "footprint" of the satellite signal, the European
Commission determined that the act of uplink would be the copyright-
triggering act: so long as the satellite broadcaster cleared rights in the
country of uplink, then receipt of the signal in other European Union
countries would not infringe the copyright owner's public
performance rights in those countries.32
From the point of view of website operators, there is much to be
said for this kind of one-stop worldwide rights clearing. Clearing
rights only in the country of upload makes it possible to ignore the
copyright laws of the countries of download. One might call this the
"Wemher von Braun approach to Internet licensing." (For the
uninitiates, Tom Lehrer sang, "Once the rocket goes up, who cares
where it comes down - 'that's not my department!' says Wemher
von Braun.' '33) Lest one accuse the European Union of flippant
disregard of the consequences of an uplink-based rule, however, note
that the European Commission also provided that the "amount of the
payment for the rights acquired" should take into account "all aspects
of the broadcast, such as the actual audience, the potential audience
and the language version."' 34 That is, even though the terms of the
satellite transmission license need conform only to the law of the
29. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,488
(2d Cir. 1998).
30. See, e.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
31. See Council Directive 93/83, 1993 O.J (L 248), [hereinafter Satellite Directive],
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, ECLAW File.
32. See id, recitals 14 & 15; art. 1.2(a)(b).
33. TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS (Reprise
Records 1965).
34. See Satellite Directive, supra note 31, at recital 17.
COPYRIGHT AND TERRITORIALITY
country of uplink, since that is the country from which the "act of
communication to the public" occurs, the price of the license should
be based upon the actual and potential public for the work, not only in
the country from which the signal goes up, but also in the countries in
which it comes down.
This does not mean that the Wernher von Braun approach is
problem-free. There are at least two significant concerns. First,
where the transmission "goes up" may be a problem, if the point of
departure is a copyright haven. In the Internet context, what is the
point of departure? The place where the server is located, or the place
where the website operator has its residence or headquarters? Under
the Satellite Directive, the copyright-engaging act occurs in the
physical place of uplink.35 But if this place is located outside the
European Union, and it does not provide for adequate protection, and
the uplinking organization has its headquarters in the European
Union, then the Satellite Directive prefers the intellectual to the
physical location of the place of the uplink: the Directive provides
that the location of the headquarters will trump offshore siting of the
physical equipment of uplinking.36
Applying these principles to the Internet, the "act of
communication to the public" would occur where the server is
located, unless this turns out to be a copyright haven. In that case,
one would look to the law of the country of the website operator's
residence/principal place of business. If neither of these countries
maintain an acceptable level of protection, it may then be necessary to
fall back on rights clearance for every country of receipt.37 Since the
transaction costs of country-by-country rights clearance are likely to
be formidable, the law-abiding website operator has an incentive
either to disseminate from a server located in a copyright-respecting
country, or to locate its business in such a country.
35. See id. at art. 1.2(b).
36. See id. at art. l(d)(ii). The act of communication to the public is "deemed to have
occurred in the Member State in which the broadcasting organization has its principal
establishment." Id.
37. Alternatively, the licensor might subject the license agreement to the law of the
author's residence. This law has a connection with the work, but not with the act of digital
dissemination, which would be attached to either, or both, the place of departure, or of receipt,
of the communication. Analytically, the designation of the place of departure characterizes the
copyright-implicating act as occurring "where it goes up," rather than "where it comes down."
Even if it seems problematic to abstract from the places of receipt, at least the point of departure
has a relationship (if not an exclusive one) with the act of communication to the public. The
author's residence does not.
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Returning to our hypothetical, suppose that Fred became
dissatisfied with his Freedonian service provider, and switched to the
U.S.-based Pangaea. Under the approach just outlined, the law under
which rights should be cleared would be the law of the U.S., where
the server is located. U.S. copyright law may be more author-
protective than Freedonia's, but that drawback might be offset by the
superior computing capacity available in the U.S. If Fred stays with a
Freedonian service provider, then Freedonian law, if adequate, will
frame the terms of the license, but the license price will still need to
reflect worldwide use. Of course, if Freedonian law, or Fred's price,
are inadequate, Henriette Bresson-Cartier or her territorial licensees
will not want to license Fred.
The second problem with the Wernher von Braun approach is
that it may make sense only when territorial rights have not already
been allocated. With respect to prior territorial grants, application of
the law of the uplink could divest Henriette's prior licensees of their
acquired rights.38 It therefore appears that Fred must obtain licenses
from all prior territorial grantees, unless Fred is willing and able to set
up his website to deny access to users from territories for which he
has not acquired the rights.39 The same would apply to any other
prior holders of territorial rights. For example, if Fred has acquired
rights for the whole world, other than the U.S., then the U.S. licensee
must limit access to its site to U.S. users.
This should not mean that Fred's website must reside on a server
outside the U.S. In this case, commercial reality, as well as the
doctrine of territoriality, undermine the European Union shortcut of
presumptively deeming the country of origin of the communication as
the only country in which a copyright-triggering act occurs. Rather,
the opposite characterization should apply: so long as Fred's users are
located outside the U.S., it should not matter that they view or obtain
images of Henriette's work by means of a server located in the U.S.
In the context of prior grants, the Wernher von Braun approach
should be rejected, it should not matter where the distribution comes
from, but rather, where it is going to.
38. See Satellite Directive, supra note 31, at recital 18 (recognizing that "application of
the country-of-origin principle contained in this Directive could pose a problem with regard to
existing contracts"); see also id. at art. 7.2 (agreements in force as of the Directive's effective
date will not be subject to the Directive until January 1, 2000, if the agreement was due to expire
after that date).
39. Cf Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (requiring Italian website operator to deny access to U.S. viewers of "Playmen").
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CONCLUSION
In a world of digital communications, copyright remains rather
earthbound. So long as substantive differences persist between
national laws allocating copyright ownership, it will be necessary to
fix a territorial origin for the work: identifying the initial copyright
owner in the country of the work's origin (the country with which the
work has the most significant relationship) is, and should remain, the
prerequisite to determining who is a proper copyright claimant
anywhere in the world. Similarly, so long as countries differ in their
definition of the scope of protection, assessments of copyright
infringement will continue to be encased in a territorial mosaic.
By contrast, when copyright owners seek to license rights for
Internet exploitation, the territorial tether relaxes. When a work is not
subject to prior territorial grants of rights, no conflicting claims
should hamper authors' ability to authorize worldwide Internet
exploitation. Nor does it seem inappropriate to subject that
authorization to the law of the single country of upload, at least when
that country affords a meaningful level of copyright protection. As a
practical matter, the parties will not ignore "where it comes down,"
since the price of the license will reflect the value of the exploitation
in all countries of receipt.
So copyright is not, or not yet, the captive of Cyberia, mainly
because copyright retains a strong sense of place, and Cyberspace is
not a "place." That said, the Internet certainly is displacing many
aspects of international copyright, by accentuating an earlier trend to
simplify copyright analysis from a plethora of places to, where
possible, a single one. But that single place may vary depending on
whether one is seeking to find out who the copyright owner is, or
whether her work has been infringed, or how to go about clearing
rights in it.
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